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We study the end of race-based busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools
(CMS). In 2001, school boundaries in CMS were redrawn dramatically, and half
of students received a new assignment. Using addresses measured prior to the
policy change, we compare students in the same neighborhood that lived on
opposite sides of a newly drawn boundary. We ﬁnd that both white and minor-
ity students score lower on high school exams when they are assigned to schools
with more minority students. We also ﬁnd decreases in high school graduation
and four-year college attendance for whites and large increases in crime for
minority males. We conclude that the end of race-based busing widened racial
inequality, despite efforts by CMS to mitigate the effect of segregation through
compensatory resource allocation. JEL Codes: I20, I24.
I. Introduction
Since the landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v.
Board of Education (347 U.S. 483), schools have been seen by
courts and policy makers as a primary social setting in which to
address racial inequality. The Brown decision declared ‘‘separate
but equal’’ schooling unconstitutional, yet efforts to engineer
racial integration through student assignment policy have been
highly controversial and not always successful. A 1971 Supreme
Court case, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
(402 U.S. 1), held that Mecklenburg County schools were de facto
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 segregated even in the absence of an explicit policy, because
neighborhoods were highly segregated, and authorized the use
of busing to achieve racial balance in schools.
Race-based busing soon spread to school districts around
the country, and court-ordered school desegregation became one
of the most ambitious social policies of the twentieth century.
Scholars have connected the widespread implementation of
school desegregation plans in the late 1960s and 1970s with
increased educational attainment for black students (Guryan
2004; Reber 2010), higher income (Ashenfelter et al. 2006;
Johnson 2011), improvements in adult health (Johnson 2011),
and decreased rates of homicide victimization and arrests
(Weiner et al. 2009). Many studies have found that segregation
widens theracial test score gap, with most (butnot all) concluding
that schools play at least as important a role as neighborhoods
(e.g., Cook and Evans 2000; Card and Rothstein 2007; Vigdor and
Ludwig 2008).
After a protracted legal battle beginning in the late 1990s,
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school (CMS) district was ordered by the
North Carolina State Supreme Court to disband race-based
busing. Beginning in fall 2002, CMS switched to a neighbor-
hood-based student choice plan. The key features of the new as-
signment policy were that school boundaries were redrawn as
contiguous areas around a school, and students were assigned
to their neighborhood school by default. Because neighborhoods
in Charlotte were still highly segregated, this change led to a
large and sudden increase in school segregation in the fall of
2002.
In this article, we study the effect of the end of court-ordered
desegregation in CMS on students’ achievement test scores, edu-
cational attainment, and criminal activity. We match college at-
tendance records from the National Student Clearinghouse
(NSC) and arrest and incarceration data from the Mecklenburg
County Sheriff (MCS) to yearly student records from CMS. These
matches are done using full name and date of birth, enabling us to
track students who subsequently leave or drop out of CMS.
Critically, the CMS data also include students’ exact addresses
measured in the fall of each school year, which allows us to assign
students to neighborhood school zones under the two policy re-
gimes. Furthermore, we use students’ addresses measured prior
to the policy change to ﬁx their location. This allows us to treat
exit from CMS, residential relocation during the prior school
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 436
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 year, and other related responses as endogenous outcomes of the
boundary change.
Our identiﬁcation strategy compares students who lived in
the same neighborhoods but whose prepolicy addresses placed
them on opposite sides of a newly drawn school boundary. We
estimate the differential effect, within small geographic areas,
of being assigned to a school with more minority students. We
then examine variation in the effects across student characteris-
tics, grade cohorts, and baseline neighborhood racial composition.
The main threat to identiﬁcation is differential neighborhood
trends that are correlated with the location of the boundaries.
We show that although minority and low-income students were
more likely to be assigned to segregated schools overall, there is
no evidence of sorting within neighborhoods across a newly
drawn boundary. We also examine the effect of the boundary
change on students in older grade cohorts, who should not have
been exposed to the policy change. We ﬁnd no evidence of prepo-
licy trends in school racial composition.
Our results show that the resegregation of CMS schools
widened inequality of outcomes between whites and minorities.
We estimate that all students, white and black, score lower on
high school exams when they attend schools with more minority
students. We ﬁnd that a 10 percentage point increase in the share
of minorities in a student’s assigned school decreases high school
test scores by about 0.014 standard deviations, which aligns clo-
sely with results from other studies of the effect of peer racial
composition (e.g., Hoxby 2000; Vigdor and Ludwig 2008;
Hanusheket al. 2009). Since the net effect of rezoning was that
students attended schools with a greater share of peers of their
own race, our estimates imply a widening of the racial achieve-
ment gap of about 0.025 standard deviations. We also ﬁnd that
white students are less likely to graduate from high school or
attend a four-year college when they are assigned to schools
with more minority students.
The rezoning of CMS schools led to large and statistically
signiﬁcant increases in crime among minority males. Our esti-
mates suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in assigned
school share minority led to an increase among minority males
in the probability of ever being arrested and ever being incarcer-
ated of about 1.5 percentage points, about an 8% increase relative
to the mean for minority males in the sample. The increase in
crime is similar in magnitude across grade cohorts and persists
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 through the end of our data in 2011, nine years after the rezoning.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the increases in crime are driven entirely
by poor minority males who live in highly segregated neighbor-
hoods and are assigned to schools with higher shares of poor
minority students. Overall, the effects on crime align with several
other studies of nonlinear peer effects, which ﬁnd that grouping
high-risk youth together increases the aggregate level of misbe-
havior and/or crime (Cook and Ludwig 2006; Carrell and
Hoekstra 2010; Bifulco et al. 2011; Deming 2011; Imberman
et al. 2012).
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the effect of rezoning on academic
outcomes is somewhat greater among older students, who were
entering or already enrolled in high school in the fall of 2002. We
present suggestive evidence that increases in resource allocation
toward high-minority high schools in CMS may have mitigated
the effect of rezoning for younger cohorts. This evidence is con-
sistent with Reber (2010), who ﬁnds that the beneﬁts of desegre-
gation were driven by increases in resources rather than
exposure to whites, and Lutz (2011), who ﬁnds evidence of com-
pensatory resource allocation after the end of court-ordered
busing across a broad range of school districts. However, the ef-
fects on crime do not diminish over time.
This article provides evidence that school segregation has an
important inﬂuence on racial inequality in longer run outcomes.
Our work is most closely related to Lutz (2011), who uses differ-
ential timing of court orders to compare outcomes in districts
before and after changes in student assignment plans and ﬁnds
that dismissal of a court order leads to small increases in the
black dropout rate in non-Southern districts. Our results comple-
ment Lutz (2011) in several ways. First, the rezoning of CMS
schools led to changes in segregation that were considerably
larger than the average district in Lutz (2011). The seven-year
change in the exposure index (a commonly used measure of seg-
regation) was about 13 percentage points, which is nearly as large
as the effect of court-ordered desegregation in the 1960s and
1970s (Rossell and Armor 1996; Guryan 2004). Second, student-
level data from a single district coupled with a quasi-experimen-
tal research design allow us to explore how changes in school
racial composition might affect students through different mech-
anisms such as school resources and peer effects (Reber 2010;
Cascio et al. 2010; Johnson 2011; Bifulco et al. 2011; Imberman
et al. 2012). Third, we add to the literature on the effect of school
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 and neighborhood interventions on long-run outcomes such as
college attendance and crime (Katz et al. 2001; Ludwig et al.
2005; Kling et al. 2007; Angrist et al. 2011; Deming 2011;
Chetty et al. 2011; Deming et al. 2013; Dobbie and Fryer 2013;).
Do segregated schools inevitably lead to racial and socioeco-
nomic inequality? Or can the consequences of school segregation
be mitigated by compensatory allocation of resources? This is a
critical question for education policy. Beginning in the early
1990s, school districts across the United States have been grad-
ually released from court-ordered desegregation plans, and
school segregation has increased as a result (Lutz 2011;
Reardon et al. 2012). Today, as a result of federal programs
such as Title I and a variety of state and local initiatives, racial
and socioeconomic gaps in school spending have narrowed con-
siderably and in some cases reversed. Our results provide sug-
gestive evidence that equal or greater resources combined with
active policy efforts may be able to reduce the effect of school
segregation on academic outcomes, but not crime. To the extent
that crime is driven by social context and peer interactions, it will
be difﬁcult for schools to address racial and economic inequality
through means other than deliberately integrative student as-
signment policies.
II. Background
The landmark Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954 disallowed de jure racial segregation of
schools, but the Court’s 1971 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools decision led to the implementation of race-based
busing. Although CMS had no explicit race-based assignment
policy, the Court ruled schools were de facto segregated, due to
highly segregated neighborhoods and contiguous catchment
areas around each school. Following the court order, school
zones in CMS were redrawn to capture noncontiguous areas
with different racial compositions. CMS was mandated to keep
each school’s percent black within 15 percentage points of the
district average, and CMS periodically redrew boundaries to
ensure that this balance was kept. Racial balance was preserved
using ‘‘satellite’’ zones that bused students from inner-city neigh-
borhoods with high shares of minority students to schools located
in suburban, highly white neighborhoods.
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 In the early 1990s, the legal status of court-ordered desegre-
gation became tenuous. Since 1990, every contested motion for a
school district to be declared unitary has resulted in a dismissal of
the desegregation plan (NAACPLegal Defense and Education
Fund 2000). Lutz (2011) ﬁnds that about 60% of the original
effect on integration is reversed within 10 years after a district
is declared unitary, and this change in segregation increases
dropout rates and private school attendance among black stu-
dents outside of the South. In 1997, a CMS parent sued the
district because their child was denied entrance to a magnet pro-
gram based on race (Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools). This case escalated into a reopening of Swann in 1999
in a series of court battles that ended in April 2002, leaving CMS
no choice but to end race-based busing permanently.
1 The CMS
school board discussed alternatives during the 1999 trial and
adopted a neighborhood-based school choice plan (the ‘‘Family
Choice Plan’’ or FCP) in December 2001.
New school boundaries for the fall of 2002 were drawn as
contiguous areas around schools. Families were assigned to
their neighborhood school by default, but could apply to attend
other schools in the district, including magnet schools. Enroll-
ment was subject to capacity constraints, and schools that were
oversubscribed had admission determined by lottery (Hastings
et al. 2008; Deming 2011; Deming et al. 2011). To limit school
segregation, CMS gave priority in the admissions lotteries to
poor students who applied to schools that were majority nonpoor.
They also paired the FCP with a program called the Equity Plan,
which provided high-poverty schools with additional resources,
such as smaller class sizes, bonuses for teachers, and bond funds
for renovation (Mickelson et al. 2009).
Under FCP, many of the previous school boundaries were
redrawn. Figure I provides an illustration of this change for two
middle schools; the top panel shows boundaries for the school
year 2001–2 and the bottom panel shows the new boundaries
drawn for fall 2002. Not only did satellite zones disappear, but
the zones surrounding both schools were redrawn to ensure that
1. InSeptember1999,thedistrictwasorderedtodiscontinuetheuseofracein
student assignment. The Swann plaintiffs appealed (Belk v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education) and in November 2000 the ruling was over-
turned, holding that further review was necessary (Mickelson 2003). In
September 2001, the declaration of unitary status was afﬁrmed, and a last-ditch
appeal to the Supreme Court was denied in April 2002.
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 schools were not overcrowded. Decisions about where to draw the
boundaries were governed primarily by enrollment projections,
with diversity taking an explicit backseat (Smith 2004; Mickelson
et al. 2009).
2 Whereas many preexisting boundaries took
FIGURE I
Rezoning for Two Middle Schools
2. For example, at the November 9, 1999, meeting of the CMS Board,
Superintendent Eric Smith described the idea behind the new process, saying,
‘‘It’s a mechanical process, not a human process. It simply draws [maps] based on
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 advantage of natural features such as streams or major roads, the
newly drawn boundaries were less likely to do so because of the
mechanical process that governed rezoning.
3 The bottom panel of
Figure I also shows how the new school zone boundaries were
often not coterminous with census block group boundaries, creat-
ing variation in school assignments for students living in the
same neighborhood.
4
The redrawing of CMS boundaries as contiguous neighbor-
hood zones led to a marked increase in school segregation
between school years 2001–2 and 2002–3. In Figure II, we see
FIGURE II
Effect of the 2002 Rezoning on the Concentration of Black Students
This ﬁgure shows the time trend in the share of CMS students in grades
6–12 who were enrolled in schools of varying racial composition. Source: NCES
Common Core of Data.
capacity and numbers of children, it doesn’t make any sense in terms where chil-
dren play, associations children naturally make as they are growing up, and it
doesn’t make any sense in terms of how families relate and interact.’’
3. Online Appendix Figure A1 shows a kernel density plot of the share of old
and new boundaries that abut a natural or manmade feature, and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distributions yields a p-value of .017.
4. We employ multiple deﬁnitions of neighborhood in our analysis, including
tax parcel groups, which were also not often coterminous with school boundaries
and are considerably smaller than census block groups.
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 that the proportion of students attending a middle or high school
with a high concentration of black students (over 65%) jumped
from 12% to 21%, while the proportion attending a relatively
integrated school—35–65% black—fell from 53% to 40%. We
ﬁnd similar patterns when we examine changes over time in
two widely used measures of segregation—the index of dissimi-
larity and the exposure index (e.g., Massey and Denton 1989).
5
The change in the exposure index from 2001–2 to 2002–3 was
about 5 percentage points. In contrast, Lutz (2011) ﬁnds that
the termination of court-ordered busing plans beginning in the
early 1990s led to virtually no short-run change in the exposure
index, and a 10-year change of about 3.5 percentage points. In
CMS, the change in the exposure index from 2001–2 to 2008–9
was about 13 percentage points, which is similar in magnitude to
the effect of court-ordered desegregation in the 1960s and 1970s
(Rossell and Armor 1996; Guryan 2004).
III. Data
We use administrative records from CMS that span kinder-
garten through 12th grade and the school years 1995–96 through
2010–11. Every student who attended a CMS school for at least
one semester is included, and students are tracked longitudinally
across years. The data include information on student demo-
graphics such as gender, race and eligibility for free or reduced
price lunch (our indicator of poverty); yearly end-of-grade (EOG)
test scores for grades 3–8 in math and reading; and scores on high
school end-of-course (EOC) exams in subjects such as algebra I,
geometry, and English. The data also include information on
graduation from CMS high schools and transfer records. Our
data also include the exact address of residence in every year
for every student in CMS, again from 1995 to the present. As
we discuss shortly, this allows us to determine each student’s
5. Online Appendix Figure A2 presents a time trend from 1998 to 2007 in the
dissimilarityandexposureindexes.Theindexofdissimilaritycanbeinterpretedas
the share ofstudents that would have to bemoved to different schools to reproduce
theoverallracialcompositionofCMSineachindividualschool.Theexposureindex
calculates the probability that a minority student’s randomly drawn schoolmate is
alsoaminority—theminimumvalueforthismeasureisthepercentminorityover-
all in the district. These measures are calculated using CMS data, whereas the
proportion of students attending segregated schools is calculated using the
Common Core of Data.
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 school assignments under the busing and postbusing regimes. We
also incorporate data from CMS’s human resource ﬁles from 1999
onward, which contain measures of teacher characteristics,
including years of experience, salary, and postsecondary
credentials.
We match CMS administrative records to a registry of all
adult (deﬁned in North Carolina as age 16 and above) arrests
and incarcerations in Mecklenburg County from 1998 to 2011.
6
The MCS tracks arrests and incarcerations across individuals
using a unique identiﬁer that is established with ﬁngerprinting.
The arrest data include information on the number and nature of
charges, and the incarceration data include a time and date of
entry and exit, with stints in county jail and state prison both
included in length of incarceration for individuals who serve
concurrently. Although these data allow us to observe future
criminal behavior of CMS students, regardless of whether they
transfer or drop out of CMS schools, they are limited to crimes
committed within Mecklenburg County.
We use data on college attendance records from the National
Student Clearinghouse (NSC), a nonproﬁt organization that pro-
vides degree and enrollment veriﬁcation for more than 3,300 col-
leges and 93% of students nationwide. NSC information is
available for every student of college age who had ever attended
a CMS school, including students who transfer to other districts
or private schools or who drop out of school altogether.
We limit our analysis sample to the seven cohorts who were
rising ﬁrst-time sixth-grade students in the fall semesters of 1996
through 2002. Students who enter CMS after the change in
boundaries are not included in the sample. Those who attended
6th grade in the fall of 1996 and progressed through school at the
normal rate of one grade a year would enter 12th grade in the fall
of 2002, and thus would have had only one year of exposure to the
change in school boundaries. In contrast, students who attended
sixth grade in the fall of 2002 spent all of their middle and high
school years in the postbusing regime. Though these seven co-
horts span the range of ‘‘treated’’ students, we also examine the
6. We use name and date of birth to link individuals across the two data
sources. Although close to 90% of the matches are exact, we recover additional
matches using an algorithm for partial matches that has been used and validated
in previous work (Deming 2011).
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 effect of rezoning on earlier cohorts in a set of speciﬁcation
checks.
If the youngest cohort of ‘‘treated’’ students had progressed
one grade a year, they would have graduated from high school in
spring 2009 and could potentially have attended college for the
ﬁrst time in fall 2009. Because our data on college attendance and
crime end in 2011, we have limited ability to look at the effect
among younger cohorts of students who experienced a change in
segregation in elementary school. We also cannot examine longer
run measures of educational attainment, such as persistence in
college and college degree completion. Thus our main measure of
postsecondary attainment will be whether a student attended
college within 12 months of the fall after their expected high
school graduation date. With this measure, students who
repeat a grade but still attend college immediately after gradu-
ation can be counted, as can students who delay postsecondary
enrollment for up to a year after on-time high school graduation.
We deﬁne residential neighborhoods within Mecklenburg
County using the 371 block groups from the 2000 Census. We
also use data from the County Tax Assessor’s Ofﬁce to deﬁne
981 ‘‘micro-neighborhoods,’’ which are based on similar real
estate parcels (Linden and Rockoff 2008). We use address records
from the spring of each school year to assign students to 2000
census geographies, micro-neighborhoods (based on tax parcel),
and middle and high school zones for both the pre- and post-2002
boundaries.
Because families may sort in response to the policy change, it
would be problematic to use their contemporaneous addresses to
assign students to neighborhoods and school zones. Instead, we
assign every student to pre- and post-2002 school zones based on
their earliest listed address, which is observed in spring 1996 in
most cases. We omit a small number of students whose ﬁrst ad-
dress is recorded in spring 2002, after the boundary change was
announced (but before fall 2002, when the new boundaries
applied). This approach minimizes the possibility that sorting
will bias our estimates, but it also increases measurement error
because some families will have moved to other areas by 2002. We
also omit all students who enter CMS after fall 2002, because of a
lack of data on prepolicy addresses. Though this approach min-
imizes bias, it also means that our results only generalize to the
type of family that had some tolerance for race-based busing—
otherwise they would not have been enrolled in CMS prior to
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 2002. We also examine two alternatives for assigning students to
neighborhoods and school zones: (1) address in the fall of ﬁfth
grade, or (2) address in the latest year observed up to fall 2001.
These options trade off the beneﬁts of comparing all students
based on residence just before entering middle school but at dif-
ferent points in time versus comparing them based on residence
just before the reform but at different grade levels. Although our
preferred estimates use the earliest address, the results are very
similar regardless of which alternative we choose.
7
Of our initial sample of 54,093 students, just over 5% have
missing or invalid address information, which leaves us with
51,020 students. We further restrict the sample to the 43,949
students who were previously enrolled in CMS in the academic
year 2001–2.
8 Table I lists descriptive statistics for our sample.
Overall, 44% of students are black, 5% are Hispanic, and just over
half of all students come from poor households (i.e., receiving free
or reduced-price lunch). Fifth-grade test scores were slightly
higher than the state average in math and reading. Overall,
52% of students were assigned to a new school as a result of the
2002 change in school zone boundaries.
Splitting the sample by the percentage of minority residents
in the student’s census block group (CBG) gives a sense of how
residential segregation would lead to school segregation under a
policy of contiguous neighborhood school zones. We split the
sample at 20% and 66% minority, which are close to the minimum
and maximum share of minority students in any CMS high school
under race-based busing. In CBGs with fewer than 20% minority
residents, few students are black (8%), Hispanic (2%), or poor
(14%), whereas in CBGs with more than 66% minority residents
the vast majority of students are black (87%) or Hispanic (5%) and
poor (89%). Although it is clear that residential and racial segre-
gation is driven predominantly by the location of black families
and students—Hispanics are a small part of the overall
7. Online Appendix Table A1 presents results for the main outcomes of the
article when we instead group students by their latest known address up to spring
2001.OnlineAppendixTableA2presentsidenticalresultswhenwegroupstudents
basedontheiraddressinﬁfthgrade(studentswhodonotenterCMSuntilafterﬁfth
grade are excluded from the analysis, regardless of grade cohort).
8. Including students who have valid address data but had left CMS prior to
2001–2 attenuates the main results slightly but does not change the statistical
signiﬁcance or the general pattern of our ﬁndings. Moreover, using 2002 and
2003 addresses to ﬁll in missing address data has no effect on the main results.
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 population and more evenly distributed across geographic
areas—the court order (and its removal) was based on the distri-
bution of both black and Hispanic students, and we aggregate the
two minority groups in our analysis. Finally, Table I shows that
the probability of being reassigned was signiﬁcant across all
neighborhoods (52%), but students living in high-minority neigh-
borhoods were muchmore likely to be reassigned (81%) relative to
those in low-minority neighborhoods (34%).
CMS currently serves over 135,000 students and is the 18th
largest school district in the nation. Moreover, the district popu-
lation was growing rapidly over this period, particularly for black
and Hispanic students. Within our sample, cohort size grew by
32% over this period, and the share of minority students grew
from roughly 40% to about 52%. These trends were slightly stron-
ger than those the entire state in overall enrollment growth
across cohorts (18%) and growth in share of minority students
(from 31% to 38%). Fifth grade math and reading scores in
CMS rose from slightly below to slightly above the state average.
TABLE I
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Full sample
CBG percent minority
<20% 20–66% >66%
Sample size 43,949 17,931 17,989 15,100
Black 0.45 0.08 0.46 0.87
Hispanic 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05
Free/reduced lunch 0.51 0.14 0.54 0.89
5th-grade math 0.03 0.56  0.03  0.56
5th-grade reading 0.02 0.55  0.04  0.56
Reassigned 0.52 0.34 0.46 0.81
Graduated high school 0.63 0.73 0.62 0.53
Attend 4-year college 0.38 0.56 0.34 0.21
Ever arrested 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.17
Ever incarcerated 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.15
Notes. These descriptive statistics are for ﬁrst-time, rising sixth-grade students in CMS between fall
1996 and fall 2002 for whom we possess valid address data ( 96% of enrolled students in these cohorts)
and who were enrolled in CMS in the 2001–2 school year. We deﬁne ‘‘minority’’ as black and Hispanic
students, and ‘‘nonminority’’ as all other ethnicities (including whites). Student eligibility to receive free or
reduced-price lunch is an indicator of poverty. Fifth-grade math and reading scores are in standard de-
viation units and are normed at the state-year level. Reassignment is an indicator for whether a student
was assigned to a new school in fall 2002, relative to the previous year. College outcomes are measured
using any attendance within the 18-month period after the student would have graduated on time from
high school. Crime outcomes are measured beginning at age 16. CBG Percent Minority reﬂects percentage
of residents who are black or Hispanic in the 2000 Census block groups in which student addresses were
located.
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 Overall, CMS is fairly representative of large, urban school dis-
tricts in the Southern United States.
IV. Empirical Strategy
Our strategy uses student addresses measured prior to the
policy change to generate quasi-experimental variation in expos-
ure to schools of varying racial composition. Figure III shows
kernel density plots (weighted by enrollment) of racial compos-
ition before and after the fall of 2002 for actual school enrollment
(top panel) and school assignment based on earliest known
address (bottom panel). Prior to rezoning, most students were
assigned to and attended a school where the percentage of minor-
ity students ranged between 35% and 65%. In the fall of 2002,
these distributions show a marked shift in mass from within the
35–65% range to the more extreme parts of the distribution, con-
sistent with the time variation shown in Figure II. It is also inter-
esting to note that in line with the presence of magnet programs
and alternative schools, the actual distribution of school racial
composition was noticeably more disperse than the assigned dis-
tribution both before and after rezoning. As Figure III shows,
segregation increased markedly in CMS schools in the school
year 2002–3.
The rezoning of CMS schools in 2002 meant that students
who lived in the same neighborhoods but on opposite sides of a
newly drawn boundary could be assigned to schools of very dif-
ferent racial compositions. In an extreme case, students living on
opposite sides of a street could be assigned to different schools.
Although the broad trend of increasing school segregation was
predictable based on the court order, it is unlikely that families
could anticipate the location of the boundary within a small
neighborhood many years in advance. Our empirical approach
formalizes this intuition by regressing outcomes of interest on
the percent minority in a student’s new school zone (based on
the prepolicy change address) while controlling for old school
zone by neighborhood ﬁxed effects. We estimate:
Yizjc ¼  0PctMinorityizjc þ  1Xizjc þ  zj þ  c þ "izjc, ð1Þ
where outcome Y for a student i living in old school zone z, neigh-
borhood j and grade cohort c, is regressed on the student’s new
school-zone percent minority (PctMinorityizjc), a set of covariates
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 FIGURE III
Density of Middle/High School Racial Composition (Enrollment Weighted)
Actual School Attended
The top panel shows kernel density plots of the distribution of the racial
composition of the schools attended by students in the sample in the years
immediately before and immediately after the rezoning. The bottom panel
shows the same thing, except for assigned school. Differences in assigned and
actual school occur because of magnet schools, schools for children with special
needs, and the Family Choice Plan that was implemented in the 2002–3 year.
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 that includes race, gender, free lunch status, and a second-order
polynomial in ﬁfth-grade math and reading scores, cohort ﬁxed
effects based on the ﬁrst year astudent enters the sixth grade( c),
and old school zone by neighborhood ﬁxed effects ( zj). We also
interact the cohort ﬁxed effects with indicators for eight demo-
graphic groups (race by gender by free lunch status) in some spe-
ciﬁcations to account for time trends in the overall demographic
composition of CMS. We cluster the standard errors at both the
prior school zone and new school zone by parcel group levels,
using the multiwayclustering procedure in Cameron et al.(2011).
With old school zone by neighborhood ﬁxed effects ( zj), the
coefﬁcient on PctMinorityizjc captures changes in school racial
composition for students who live on opposite sides of a newly
drawn boundary. In neighborhoods where there is no new bound-
ary, PctMinorityizjc will have the same value for all students and
thus will not contribute to the estimation of  0. We deﬁne neigh-
borhoods in two ways. First, we use CBGs, which are the smallest
geographic area for which demographic information is released
by the Census Bureau. Our second neighborhood deﬁnition is the
micro-neighborhood parcel group, previously mentioned, which is
used for property tax assessment. Even with these small spatial
deﬁnitions of neighborhood, 56% of micro-neighborhoods in CMS
had a new boundary drawn through them. The median number of
students per micro-neighborhood across our eight sample cohorts
is 142. For increasingly small deﬁnitions of a neighborhood, our
approach converges to a boundary discontinuity design as in
Black (1999) and Bayer et al. (2007), with the important differ-
ence that we examine newly drawn boundaries using addresses
measured prior to the redrawing. We use parcel groups in our
main results, but in general our results are very similar with
the two different neighborhood deﬁnitions.
Though our approach considers the ‘‘treatment’’ to be a
change in school racial composition, PctMinorityizjc is in fact
just one of many possible ways we could have deﬁned the mean-
ing of the change in school boundaries. Our approach creates
groups of students who lived in the same neighborhoods and
were formerly zoned to the same schools. After the boundary
change, some of these students received a new school assignment,
and some did not. One possible approach would be to replace
PctMinorityizjc with an indicator variable for receiving a new
school assignment. This would compare students who switched
schools to students who did not. However, boundary changes in
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 other neighborhoods bring new peer groups into schools, even if a
student’s own assignment does not change. In a sense, nearly
every student is ‘‘treated’’ by the policy. We have chosen to take
a particular stand on the nature of the ‘‘treatment’’—namely, that
it can be measured by PctMinorityizjc—because the policy change
represented the end of race-based busing. As we show later, other
ways of deﬁning changes in peers (income, prior test scores) are
equally valid. In that sense, we are estimating the effect of
changes in school racial composition and everything that is cor-
related with it. Redrawing CMS school boundaries led to rich
variation in the racial composition of students’ assigned schools.
While students were overall more likely to be assigned to schools
with peers of their own race, a signiﬁcant share of nonminority
students were reassigned to schools with higher minority enroll-
ment, and a signiﬁcant share of minority students were re-
assigned to schools with lower minority enrollment.
9
Our main results focus on the reduced-form effect of being
assigned to a new school. An alternative approach is to use as-
signed school racial composition as an instrument for actual
school racial composition as part of a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) procedure. We pursue the reduced-form approach for
two reasons. First, we must account for differential exposure by
grade cohort to the new school zone boundaries, and any choice of
scaling involves strong assumptions about the nature of the treat-
ment. For example, we could estimate the effect of cumulative
exposure by multiplying students’ percent minority in the new
school zone by the number of years they were enrolled after the
policy change. However, this assumes that the effect accumulates
linearly and is the same for all age groups. Second, there is the
difﬁcult issue of howto treat students wholeave CMS, since we do
not know the racial composition of their new school (or if they are
attending any school). If students who attend highly segregated
schools are more likely to drop out, then a cumulative scaling
would not be appropriate.
We present results with all grade cohorts pooled together, as
well as separated out by ‘‘middle school’’ and ‘‘high school’’
9. Moreover, there is considerable variation even within neighborhoods—the
mean interquartile range within parcel groups with variation in the change in
percent minority is about 10 percentage points for the middle school boundaries
and 7 percentage points for high school. Online Appendix Figure A3 shows the
distribution of the change in the percent of minority students between each stu-
dent’s new and old school zone, separately by race.
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 cohorts. Students who were entering grades 6–8 and grades 9–12
in fall 2002 are in the ‘‘middle school’’ and ‘‘high school’’ cohorts,
respectively. We also investigate the sensitivity of our results to a
wide array of alternative speciﬁcations, such as nonlinear effects
of changes in peers and different measures of school composition.
IV.A. Checks on Nonrandom Sorting and Attrition
The key concern with our approach is that student charac-
teristics are systematically correlated with being on a particular
side of a newly drawn school boundary, even within small geo-
graphic areas. If true, this would confound our estimates of the
effect of being zoned to a school with more minority students.
While we cannot measure the inﬂuence of unobserved student
characteristics, we can test whether students’ observed charac-
teristics such as race, income, and test scores are systematically
correlated with our independent variable of interest. To test
this, we estimate a regression like equation (1), except with
PctMinorityizjc as the outcome variable and demographics and
prior test scores as the key independent variables, along with
cohort and old zone by parcel group ﬁxed effects. We then conduct
an F-test for the joint hypothesis that all the covariates are equal
to 0. None of the coefﬁcients are individually statistically signiﬁ-
cant, and we fail to reject this hypothesis in the full sample and
then in separate speciﬁcations for the high school and middle
school cohorts. These results, in Online Appendix Table A3,
show that students in the same neighborhoods but with different
values of PctMinorityizjc after the rezoning have very similar
characteristics. Despite the apparent balance on prior student
characteristics, we still control for them in our main
speciﬁcations.
Another potential concern for our analysis is incomplete ex
post observation of students in our sample, that is, attrition bias.
This is particularly relevant for short-run outcomes, like exam
scores, which only are available for students who continue to be
enrolled in CMS.
10 In Online Appendix Table A4we show that the
effect of the rezoning on short-run attrition is very small and only
statistically signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations.
11 Importantly,
10. Overall,4.3% ofnonminority studentsand3.3%ofminority studentsinour
analysis sample were no longer enrolled in CMS in fall 2002.
11. We estimate equation (1), with an indicator variable for being enrolled in
CMSinfall2002astheoutcome.WeﬁndthattheprobabilityofstayinginCMSthe
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 452
 
a
t
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
L
i
b
r
a
r
y
 
o
n
 
M
a
y
 
2
1
,
 
2
0
1
4
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
q
j
e
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 attrition from CMS is not a concern for our analysis of crime and
college-going, which are measured outside of CMS data. Rather,
the main concern in these analyses is whether the new student
assignment policy is correlated with students’ future criminal
activity outside of Mecklenburg County or attendance at one of
the few colleges not covered by the NSC. We ﬁnd no evidence to
suggest that nonrandom attrition from these data sources is prob-
lematic for our results.
12
IV.B. Impact of Rezoning on Enrollment
Another possible concern is that the location of the new
school boundaries was chosen based on preexisting trends in
neighborhood racial composition. In this scenario, the effect of
being reassigned would be a smooth trend line that shows up in
prior cohorts. We examine this possibility by estimating a series
of ‘‘ﬁrst-stage’’ regressions, with (attended) school percent minor-
ity as the outcome, separately by grade and year. Concretely, we
measure the effect of being reassigned in fall 2002 on the racial
composition of grade cohorts from fall 1995 to fall 2006, using
students’ earliest addresses in all cases. In Figure IV we present
estimates from versions of equation (1), with each point repre-
senting an estimate of  0 and its associated 95% conﬁdence inter-
vals, for a particular grade and year combination. Overall, we see
no evidence of pretrends in the percent minority of students’ at-
tended schools in relation to the new school assignments. The
conﬁdence intervals for almost all grade cohorts prior to fall
2002 include zero, and there are no obvious trends or differences
across grades. Consistent with our identiﬁcation strategy, we see
a steep and discontinuous spike in school percent minority begin-
ning in fall 2002 and persisting for the next ﬁve cohorts. The size
of this ‘‘ﬁrst-stage’’ coefﬁcient ranges from 0.2 to 0.3, indicating
that a 10 percentage point increase in assigned school percent
minority leads to about a 2.5 percentage point increase in
followingyearrisesbyabout.002forstudentsassignedtoaschoolwith10percent-
age points more minority students. In Panel B (column (2)), we see that this small
increase is concentrated among minorities, though estimated effects of a 10% in-
crease in minority enrollment at the assigned school are always below 0.01.
12. Thoughwecannottestforthistypeofnonrandomselectiondirectly,thefact
thatweﬁnd verysmallincreases in initialattrition fromCMSrelated tothe rezon-
ing helps support the notion that data limitations do not drive our results. The
interpretation of later attrition is complicated by the fact that some students who
leave CMS may actually be dropping out of school altogether.
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 attended school percent minority. The one exception is 12th
grade, where we see a much smaller estimate in fall 2002 that
gradually increases for later cohorts. This is most likely due to the
explicit priority that rising 12th-grade students were given in the
FCP discussed earlier, combined with a reluctance of students to
change schools in their last year of high school.
While the estimates are relatively precise, a coefﬁcient of less
than 1 does suggest imperfect compliance with the newly drawn
boundaries. Noncompliance can happen for three reasons. First,
the use of earliest known address minimizes potential bias from
student sorting, and also induces some measurement error be-
cause families may no longer live in the same residence by
2002. Second, the FCP allowed for families to choose schools
other than the ones to which they were assigned, including
magnet schools (which have no neighborhood zone). As noted by
Kane et al. (2005), CMS made every effort to accommodate
FIGURE IV
Effect of Rezoning on School Racial Composition by Grade and Year
Each point is the key coefﬁcient and associated 95% conﬁdence interval
from a regression like equation (1), estimated separately by grade and year,
and is interpreted as the effect of a 100 percentage point increase in the share
minority of a student’s assigned school on the share minority of the school the
student actually attended in fall 2002. Thus, coefﬁcients for years prior to 2002
act as a check for prepolicy trends in school racial composition.
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 choices in the ﬁrst year, in part by expanding capacity at schools
where they anticipated high demand. Third, noncompliance by
individual students has an indirect effect because it alters the
racial composition of the school for other students. For example,
if whites are more likely than minorities within the same school
zone to opt out and attend a magnet school, then the ﬁrst-stage
coefﬁcient for compliers will still be less than one because the
school is not as ‘‘white’’ as it would have been with perfect
compliance.
Table II presents results for a variety of ﬁrst stage outcomes.
Panel A shows results from estimates of equation (1) with percent
minority in a student’s fall 2002 school as the outcome. In Panel
B, which allows the effect of assignment to vary by race, we see
that the effect is a bit stronger for whites. The focus on the per-
cent minority students as a policy outcome is motivated by our
study of the elimination of race-based busing. Minority students
tend to be poorer, have lower academic achievement, and have
more disciplinary problems than nonminorities, and the policy
changes we study will affect the composition of schools along
these dimensions as well. To illustrate, columns (2) and (3) of
Table II show that a 10 percentage point increase in the share
of minority students in the school zone also leads to having peers
that are about 2 percentage points more likely to be eligible for
free lunches and who scored about 0.03 standard deviations lower
on the ﬁfth-grade math exam. Thus the ‘‘ﬁrst-stage’’ results are
very similar across measures of peer race, income and prior test
scores. In Online Appendix Tables A5–A7 we show that we can
obtain very similar main results when we replace PctMinorityizjc
with these other measures of school composition. As in other stu-
dies of the effect of racial segregation on schools (e.g., Guryan
2004; Jackson 2009; Lutz 2011), our research design cannot sep-
arate the effect of race from other factors with which it is corre-
lated, and our results should be interpreted with this in mind.
Nevertheless, most efforts to desegregate schools have focused on
ethnic and racial composition and have relied on manipulation of
school boundaries, so our empirical strategy is well suited to an-
swering a question of great policy interest.
A key point of interpretation is that our results are driven by
students who comply with school zone assignments.
13 Even
13. About 73% of nonminority students and 55% of minorities attended their
assigned school, 9% of nonminorities and minorities attended their previously
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 before the policy change and the implementation of the FCP, only
about 65% of students attended their assigned school, mostly be-
cause of the existence of magnet programs and alternative
schools. This dropped to about 57% in 2002–3, and gradually
rose back up to about 65% by 2005–6.
14 We ﬁnd little evidence
of differential attendance by school type across the newly drawn
boundaries, save a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the prob-
ability of attending a magnet program that is concentrated
among nonminorities (column (5)). To the extent that magnet
schools are academically better than a student’s assigned
school, this will make the results for whites look more favorable
than if we had perfect compliance. Finally, rezoning may have
also affected families’ decisions to change residence within CMS.
In columns (6) and (7), we examine moves between two consecu-
tive school years, from 2001–2 to 2002–3 (the ﬁrst year of the new
student assignment plan), and ﬁnd no evidence of differences in
residential relocation in the years leading up to the policy change.
V. Main Results
Table III contains the main results of the article. Panel A
presents results that pool all students. Panels B and C allow the
effects to vary by race and race and gender, respectively. The
outcome in column (1) is the average of (standardized) scores on
high school EOC exams in four separate subjects.
15 We ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant decrease in high school test scores of
about 0.014 standard deviations for a 10 percentage point
increase in share minority. The impacts are slightly larger for
nonminorities, but none of the effects by race or gender are sig-
niﬁcantly different from each other. In other studies in this lit-
erature, an increase of about 10 percentage points in share
assigned school, 9% of nonminorities and 13% of minorities attended magnet
schools, and the remaining students chose another CMS school.
14. OnlineAppendixTableA8showstheshareofstudentsattendingtheirhome
school by grade cohort and year.
15. The four high school test subjects are English I, algebra I, geometry, and
algebra II. We average across them to maximize statistical power, and there is no
strong pattern of effects by subject. See Online Appendix Table A9 for separate
results by test subject. In cases where a student took the exam multiple times, we
only use the score from the ﬁrst exam. When students are missing one or more
scores, we simply take the average over the available scores.
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 minority has been found to translate to a decrease in math scores
of between 0.04 and 0.07 standard deviations (e.g., Hoxby 2000;
Vigdor and Ludwig 2008; Hanushek et al. 2009). Although we
cannot make a direct comparison given differences in method-
ology, scaling our reduced-form coefﬁcient of 0.014 by the ‘‘ﬁrst-
stage’’ estimate from Table II (0.25) suggests that our estimates
are very much in line with this earlier work.
Although there is some variation across students in the
timing of the test, controlling for the grade in which the exams
are taken has little effect on our estimates, suggesting that
timing was not sensitive to the rezoning. Selection into high
school test taking is a more serious concern, because advanced
math tests are not required for graduation and some students
may drop out of high school or leave CMS prior to when they
would have taken the exam. We test the robustness of our results
by probing their sensitivity to different imputation procedures for
missing test scores. The results of these imputations, contained in
Online Appendix Table A10, indicate that missing values are not
driving our results.
Columns (2) and (3) present results for educational attain-
ment. The results in Panel A show no overall impact of rezoning
on high school graduation or four-year college attendance.
However, we ﬁnd large and statistically signiﬁcant decreases in
attainment for nonminority students. The estimates imply that
an increase of 10 percentage points in share minority of assigned
school leads to a reduction of just over 1 percentage point in both
high school graduation and four-year college attendance. In con-
trast, we ﬁnd a small increase in attainment for minority stu-
dents, although the results are not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. We can strongly reject equality of the estimates by race
(p<.001). However, the attainment results are not signiﬁcantly
different by gender. When we estimate results for the high school
cohorts separately by poverty status (not shown), we ﬁnd that
most of the effect on high school graduation is driven by poor
nonminorities (where poverty is proxied by eligibility for free or
reduced-price lunches), whereas most of the effect on college at-
tendance occurs among nonpoor students.
Columns (4) and (5) present results for adult crime. The out-
comes are indicators for whether a student has ever been arrested
in Mecklenburg County and ever been incarcerated in county jail
or state prison, respectively. We ﬁnd that students who are as-
signed to a school with 10 percentage points more minority
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, EDUCATION, AND CRIME 459
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 students are about 0.7 percentage points more likely to have ever
been arrested and 0.6 percentage points more likely to have ever
been incarcerated. The effect on arrests is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10% level. In Panel B, we see that the effects for both crime
outcomes are signiﬁcantly greater for minority students (p=.002
and p=.015). Panel C shows further that the increases in crime
are driven almost entirely by minority males, who are 1.6 per-
centage points more likely to be arrested and 1.3 percentage
points more likely to be incarcerated for a 10 percentage point
increase in share minority of assigned school.
Students who move outside of Mecklenburg County (perhaps
by attending an out-of-town college) could in principle commit
crimes that are not recorded in our data. However, the results
for criminal outcomes are nearly identical when we restrict our
analysis to students with no college record or when we eliminate
students who attend college outside Mecklenburg County. Wecan
also investigate the pattern of results over time by breaking the
arrest data into four-month windows. This acts as an additional
robustness check, because being rezoned in 2002 should not affect
crime prior to the announcement of the policy change. The re-
sults, in Online Appendix Figure A4, show a statistically signiﬁ-
cant increase in arrests that begins around the time of rezoning
and persists at roughly the same level for nine years, through the
end of our data in 2011, when the age of students in our sample
ranges roughly from 19 to 25. Online Appendix Table A11 con-
tains results for additional outcomes such as selective college at-
tendance and total number of arrests.
After the rezoning of CMS schools, students attended schools
with a greater share of peers of their own race. Thus we can pro-
ject the effect of our results on racial inequality in outcomes. In
Table III, we show estimated test score decreases for students of
all racial backgrounds when they attend schools with more mi-
nority students. Since the rezoning led to a decrease in the share
of minority peers for white students and an increase for minority
students, the net effect was a widening of racial inequality in test
scores. To get a sense of the magnitude, we multiply the point
estimates from Table III by the mean change in the assigned
share minority before and after the rezoning, separately by
race. This calculation implies that the rezoning widened the
racial gap in high school math scores by about 0.025 standard
deviations. However, because of the opposite signs on the coefﬁ-
cients for high school graduation and college attendance, we ﬁnd
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 only a very small change in the racial gap in educational attain-
ment (about 0.3 percentage point). The effects on crime imply that
the racial gap in arrest and incarceration rates widened by about
1 percentage point, and nearly 2 percentage points for males.
V.A. Variation in Effects by Grade Cohort
In Table IV we allow the effect of rezoning to vary by grade
cohort. Some students were already most of the way through high
school when busing ended, whereas others attended most of
middle school and high school in more segregated schools.
Examining variation in effects across grade cohorts yields insight
into the mechanisms underlying our results—for example, if the
impact of school segregation is cumulative, we might expect to
ﬁnd larger effects for younger grade cohorts. We estimate equa-
tion (1) for each of the main outcomes of the article, adding an
interaction between PctMinorityizjc and an indicator variable for
whether a student is in the younger ‘‘middle school’’ cohorts, that
is, entering grades 6–8 in fall 2002. In this setup, the main effect
gives the effect for students in the ‘‘high school’’ cohorts—grades
9–12 in fall 2002, and the p-value on the interaction is a test for
signiﬁcant differences by grade cohort. We divide the sample into
these two groups for ease of presentation—Online Appendix
Table A12 shows results that are estimated separately for each
grade cohort.
In column (1) of Table IV, we see that a 10 percentage point
increase in share minority of assigned school leads to a decrease
of about 0.020 standard deviation for students in the high school
cohorts, but the interaction term is positive, implying a decrease
of only about 0.013 standard deviation in the middle school co-
horts. This difference is marginally insigniﬁcant at conventional
levels (p=.108). In column (2), we also see a small, positive, and
statistically insigniﬁcant interaction term for high school gradu-
ation. In column (3), we ﬁnd a large difference in the effect on
four-year college attendance. A 10 percentage point increase in
share minority of assigned school leads to a decline in college
attendance of about 0.6 percentage point for the high school co-
horts, but an increase of about 0.5 percentage point in the middle
school cohorts. The interaction term is statistically signiﬁcant at
the less than 1% level. However, in columns (4) and (5) we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant difference across cohorts for crime outcomes. The
bottom half of Table IV allows these effects to vary further by
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 students’ own race. The pattern of results is very similar to the
pooled speciﬁcation.
To test for the overall signiﬁcance of this pattern, we gener-
ate a summary index that (1) normalizes all ﬁve outcomes to have
mean 0 and standard deviation 1; (2) reverses sign for the crime
outcomes so that positive values are ‘‘good’’; and (3) takes the
simple average across the ﬁve outcomes, or four of ﬁve when
high school test scores are missing. We also create a similar
index that averages across the three academic (i.e., noncrime)
outcomes. The results are in columns (6) and (7). We ﬁnd that
attending a school with 10 percentage points more minority stu-
dents leads to a decline of about 0.014 standard deviation in out-
comes for students in the high school cohorts, and about 0.010
standard deviation in the middle school cohorts. The difference is
not statistically signiﬁcant. However, we do ﬁnd a highly signiﬁ-
cant (p=.002) difference of about 0.010 standard deviation across
cohorts for the three academic outcomes, driven mostly by four-
year college attendance. The difference is larger (about 0.013
standard deviation) for minority students. From this we conclude
that the impact of rezoning on racial inequality was modestly
larger for students in the older grade cohorts, particularly for
academic outcomes and for racial minorities. The next section
explores possible reasons for this pattern of results.
VI. Discussion
We consider four possible explanations for the pattern of re-
sults. The ﬁrst is that the effect of rezoning comes not through
changes in the school itself but from endogenous reactions, such
as families exiting CMS for private school or moving to a different
neighborhood to attend another public school. We examine the
effect of endogenous mobility in a variety of ways and ﬁnd no
evidence that this is an important contributor to our results.
16
The second possible explanation is that students may be
harmed by additional school transitions. In this scenario, it is
16. InOnlineAppendixTableA13wereestimateourmainresultsforcrimeand
collegeattendancewhileexcludingtheapproximately4%ofstudentswhowerenot
enrolledinCMSinfall2002.InOnlineAppendixTableA14weexcludetheapproxi-
mately 14% of students who relocated to a new address between fall 2001 and fall
2002. In Online Appendix Table A15 we estimate the effect of rezoning on attrition
from CMS over time.
SCHOOL SEGREGATION, EDUCATION, AND CRIME 463
 
a
t
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
L
i
b
r
a
r
y
 
o
n
 
M
a
y
 
2
1
,
 
2
0
1
4
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
q
j
e
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 not the racial composition of the school that matters but simply
being rezoned to any new school. We test this explanation in three
ways. First, in Online Appendix Table A12 we analyze results
separately by cohort to see if the impacts are smaller for rising
6th- and 9th-grade cohorts, when most students are attending a
new school anyway. Second, in Online Appendix Table A16 we
restrict the sample only to students who received a new school
assignment, to see if there is a similar gradient in outcomes by
peer characteristics once we eliminate students who kept the
same school assignment. In both cases, we ﬁnd no evidence that
the results are driven by additional school transitions. A third
related hypothesis is that the increase in crime among minority
males is explained by the end of the long bus rides that often
characterize school desegregation plans. We test for this possibil-
ity in Online Appendix Table A17 by excluding the approximately
4.5% of students who attended noncontiguous school zones prior
to the policy change (the ‘‘bused’’ children), but it has very little
effect on our results.
VI.A. Changes in Resource Allocation
A third possible explanation for the results is that the end of
race-based busing shifted the allocation of resources across CMS
schools. Recent work on the effect of court-ordered school deseg-
regation in the 1960s and 1970s shows that racial integration was
also accompanied by a narrowing of racial gaps in per-pupil
spending and class size (Cascioet al. 2010; Reber 2010; Johnson
2011). This suggests that increased resources, beyond changes
in school racial composition itself, may have been an import-
ant mechanism for improvements in the outcomes of black
students during this period (e.g., Margo 1990; Card and
Krueger 1992).
Did the resegregation of CMS schools widen racial gaps in
resources? Jackson (2009) shows that teachers, who are the
main factor in school expenditures, sorted across schools in re-
sponse to the policy change—he ﬁnds that a 10 percentage point
increase in the share of black students leads to a reduction in
elementary school teacher value-added of about 0.01 to 0.02 tea-
cher-level standard deviation. Those results show that resources
shifted away from schools that received inﬂows of poor and
minority students. However, the results in Jackson (2009) only
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 apply to the ﬁrst year of the rezoning and are not focused on high
schools.
We investigate changes in school resources over time using
a detailed database of CMS teacher and staff characteristics.
Although we were unable to obtain disaggregated spending
data for the years prior to rezoning, the personnel data (which
includes teacher salaries) go back to 1999. This enables us to
calculate per-pupil spending on teacher salaries, which is the
most important contributor to school spending (and nearly all of
spending on instruction). We can also investigate changes across
schools and over time in teacher characteristics such as education
and experience.
To address equity concerns and perhaps in anticipation of
teacher sorting, CMS paired the new student assignment policy
with a program called the Equity Plan, which provided additional
funds to high poverty schools for recruitment bonuses for tea-
chers, lower student-teacher ratios, school renovation projects,
learning equipment, and supplies (Mickelson et al. 2009).
However, budget cuts limited the effect of the Equity Plan in
the ﬁrst years after rezoning (Mickelson et al. 2009). In 2006,
CMS began a program called the High School Challenge, which
targeted the four high schools with the highest shares of poor and
minority students. The High School Challenge was created as a
response to the schools’ inability to meet state accountability
benchmarks for achievement on EOC tests and was funded by
the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners and the federal
Teacher Incentive Fund (CMS Schools 2005). The program
increased teacher salaries in these schools by 15% and offered
signing bonuses of up to $15,000, but also increased accountabil-
ity, allowing for expedited removal of teachers and principals
as well as restructuring of schools that were not meeting per-
formance standards (CMS Schools 2008). By 2008, the High
School Challenge schools had increased their performance on
a composite of EOC tests by an average of 12 percentile ranks.
The one school that did not make substantial gains (Garinger
High School, which moved from 41% to 43% from 2005 to 2008)
was reconstituted as ﬁve small ‘‘academy’’ programs with themes
such as technology, business and ﬁnance, and international
studies.
Teacher salary data conﬁrm the narrative above. Per-pupil
spending on teacher salaries was close to uniform across schools
prior to rezoning, become modestly more variable in 2002–3, and
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 then diverged further in 2006–7 when the High School Challenge
program was implemented.
17 Beginning in 2006–7, the four tar-
geted high schools spent about 20% more per pupil (not including
capital costs) than the average CMS high school. More generally,
the relationship between the share of minority students in a CMS
high school and two measures of resources (per-pupil spending
net of capital costs and the student/teacher ratio) was strongly
positive.
Thus one hypothesis for the pattern of results shown in
Table IV is that compensatory resource allocation toward high-
minority high schools in CMS mitigated the effect of rezoning on
academic outcomes in later cohorts. As a partial test of this hy-
pothesis, we include PctMinorityizjc along with time-varying re-
sources in a ‘‘horse race’’ speciﬁcation. We calculate resource
measures based on the teachers in each student’s high school
averaged across all post-rezoning years that the student was
still enrolled. We calculate the resource measures based on stu-
dents assigned rather than actual school because it mimics the
construction of PctMinorityizjc and the logic of our identiﬁcation
strategy. Because both measures vary only at the school cohort
level, this effectively asks whether the impact of changing peer
composition can be explained by changes in resource allocation
across schools and over time.
The top panel of Table V shows speciﬁcations where
PctMinorityizjc is entered along with the percent of teachers
with a bachelor’s degree from a selective college, and the bottom
panel shows separate speciﬁcations where PctMinorityizjc is
entered along with per-pupil teacher wages. Clotfelter et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that the selectivity of undergraduate institution has
a statistically signiﬁcant and positive effect on achievement
among high school students in North Carolina. Looking at effects
on high test scores in column (1), we see that the negative effects
in Table III can be explained completely by changes in resources.
The coefﬁcients for PctMinorityizjc are positive and insigniﬁcantly
different from zero for both resource measures. The pattern of
results is very similar for college attendance in column (2). We
17. Mean per-pupil spending on teacher salaries in CMS high schools was
$3,494 in 2001–2 with a standard deviation of only $354. In 2002–3, the mean
was $3,652 but the standard deviation rose to $583. In 2006–7, mean per-pupil
spending on teacher salaries had risen to $5,313 (this includes the incentive
money from the High School Challenge) with a standard deviation of $1,219.
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 can interpret these estimates as suggesting that there is no effect
of increases in assigned school share minority on academic out-
comes when resources are equalized across schools. Nevertheless,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant correlation between teacher education and
the effects on crime, and the coefﬁcient on per-pupil wages, while
statistically signiﬁcant, is about 50% smaller than the effects for
academic outcomes.
It is important to note that this evidence does not demon-
strate the causal effect of teacher characteristics or teacher sal-
aries, because changes in these resource measures could be
correlated with changes in other unobserved determinants of
school quality, such as peer characteristics. Still, these results
provide some qualiﬁed support for the hypothesis that changes
in resource allocation can explain the pattern of effects over time.
TABLE V
CORRELATION BETWEEN MAIN RESULTS AND TIME-VARYING SCHOOL RESOURCES
(1) (2) (3)
HS test
scores
Attend
4-year college
Ever
incarcerated
Panel A: All cohorts
All students:
Share minority in new school zone 0.015  0.014 0.006
[0.048] [0.022] [0.017]
% Teacher BA, selective coll. 0.545** 0.335** 0.066
[0.242] [0.141] [0.089]
Panel B: All cohorts
All students:
Share minority in new school zone 0.013  0.017 0.007
[0.047] [0.022] [0.017]
Teacher salary per pupil (in $1000s) 0.018** 0.017***  0.012***
[0.007] [0.004] [0.003]
Observations 30,498 38,037 38,037
Notes. Within panels, each column shows coefﬁcients and standard errors from a separate estimate of
equation (1), and is interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with 100 percentage points more
minority students, where the effect is allowed to vary by race as indicated in each row. Both share minority
andtheindicated school-levelteachercharacteristic areincludedintheregressiontogether,toseeifresources
can ‘‘explain’’ away the effect of school racial composition. Panel A includes a measure of the share of teachers
with a degree from a selective college, and Panel B includes an alternative measure of resources—teacher
salaries per pupil enrolled. All regressions control for race by cohort ﬁxed effects, parcel group by prior middle
and high school zone ﬁxed effects, and quadratics in ﬁfth-grade math and reading scores plus dummies for
missing scores. Teacher characteristics are averaged across all post-rezoning years in which a student was
enrolled. Column (1) is the average across all nonmissing high school test scores in English I, algebra I,
geometry, and algebra II. College attendance records are obtained from the NSC data and criminal records
areobtainedfromtheMecklenburg CountySheriff;bothcantrackstudentswholeaveCMSschools.Wedeﬁne
‘‘minority’’ as black and Hispanic students, and ‘‘nonminority’’ as all other ethnicities (including whites).
Standard errors are clustered at the prior zone and new zone by parcel group levels, using the multiway
clustering procedure of Cameron et al. (2011). ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
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 Additional evidence that the pattern of results might be ex-
plained by academic improvements in high-minority schools over
the period we study can be found in data on measures of upper
level and advanced placement (AP) course-taking (Online
Appendix Table A18). For students in the high school cohorts,
being assigned to a school with more minority students led to
decreased enrollment in honors and advanced math courses
(deﬁned as precalculus and above), as well as decreases in the
probability of taking an AP science or English course. However,
we ﬁnd no impact on advanced course-taking for the youngest
group of students.
VI.B. Peer Effects
If most of the effect of school segregation were driven by
associated changes in resources—either ﬁnancial or in terms of
nonﬁnancial inputs such as teacher quality—then policy makers
could address racial inequality directly through compensatory
policies (such as the High School Challenge), rather than manip-
ulating student assignment directly. However, a fourth possible
explanation is that the rezoning of CMS schools led to changes in
peer interactions and/or school context. Unlike the allocation of
resources, peer interactions and school context may be very dif-
ﬁcult for a school district to manipulate.
Because race, poverty, and test scores are strongly corre-
lated, the rezoning of CMS schools also widened inequality by
family income and prior achievement. In Table VI we attempt
to disentangle the separate inﬂuences of each attribute by esti-
mating another horse race speciﬁcation that adds all three meas-
ures of changes in peers to equation (1), in the spirit of Cutler and
Glaeser (1997) and Hoxby and Weingarth (2006). This speciﬁca-
tion identiﬁes off of the independent variation across student at-
tributes (i.e., poor whites, nonpoor minorities, high-scoring poor
students, etc.). We also report the p-values on F-tests for the joint
hypotheses that (1) all three coefﬁcients (race, income, test
scores) are equal to zero, and (2) all three coefﬁcients are equal
to each other. The ﬁrst test measures whether changes in peers
have any net effect on the outcomes in each column. The second
test measures whether the peer attributes are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from each other.
Our main results are robust to including all peer attributes in
the model together. We fail to reject the joint hypotheses that all
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 coefﬁcients are equal to zero for the same set of outcomes and
groups that were signiﬁcantly different from zero in the main
results. For crime, we also cannot reject equality of effects
across the three peer attributes. In other words, attending a
school with more minority children has roughly the same effect
as attending a school with more poor or lower scoring children.
TABLE VI
PEER EFFECTS:W HICH CHARACTERISTICS MATTER?
(1) (2) (3)
HS test
scores
Attend
4-year college
Ever
incarcerated
All cohorts combined
Pct minority in new school zone for:
Nonminority student 0.016  0.049 0.322
[0.166] [0.102] [0.208]
Minority student  0.043  0.082 0.265
[0.146] [0.080] [0.226]
Pct. free lunch in new school zone for:
Nonminority student  0.366**  0.131  0.247
[0.163] [0.103] [0.183]
Minority student  0.110  0.122  0.189
[0.137] [0.084] [0.187]
Avg. math scores in new school zone for:
Nonminority student  0.291***  0.087**  0.034
[0.063] [0.038] [0.084]
Minority student  0.142*  0.183***  0.004
[0.075] [0.039] [0.086]
F(all coeffs=0), nonminority 0.000 0.019 0.355
F(all coeffs=0), minority 0.221 0.000 0.096
F(all coeffs equal), nonminority 0.000 0.026 0.280
F(all coeffs equal), minority 0.221 0.001 0.172
Observations 31,675 43,949 43,949
Notes. Each column shows coefﬁcients and standard errors from a separate estimate of equation (1),
and is interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with 100 percentage points more students of
each type (race, free lunch eligible), or a 1 standard deviation increase in ﬁfth-grade math scores, holding
the other two peer characteristics constant. The effect is also allowed to vary by student’s own race as
indicated in each row. All regressions control for race by cohort ﬁxed effects, parcel group by prior middle
and high school zone ﬁxed effects, and quadratics in ﬁfth-grade math and reading scores plus dummies for
missing scores. The two rows immediately below the coefﬁcients report p-values on F-tests of the hypoth-
esis that the three peer characteristics are jointly equal to 0, for nonminorities and minorities, respect-
ively. This tests whether peers ‘‘matter’’ for the indicated outcomes. The next two rows report p-values on
F-tests for the hypothesis that the peer characteristics are jointly equal to each other. This tests whether
peer characteristics can be separated into independent inﬂuences. Column (1) is the average across all
nonmissing high school test scores in English I, algebra I, geometry, and algebra II. College attendance
records are obtained from the NSC data and criminal records are obtained from the Mecklenburg County
Sheriff; both can track students who leave CMS schools. Standard errors are clustered at the prior zone
and new zone by parcel group levels, using the multiway clustering procedure of Cameronet al. (2011).
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
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 However, conditional on peer race and poverty status, at-
tending a school with higher scoring children actually lowers stu-
dents’ own test scores and makes them less likely to attend
college. This pattern is stronger among whites for test scores
and stronger among minorities for four-year college attendance.
This surprising result implies, for example, that students of all
races beneﬁt the most academically from exposure to more low-
scoring, nonpoor whites, and that they beneﬁt the least from ex-
posure to high-scoring, poor minorities. One possible mechanism
is high school course tracking, which limits access to college-level
courses to the highest scoring students within a school, or the
‘‘frog pond’’ effect of increased competition and class rank
(Attewell 2001; Crosnoe 2009). Thus the offsetting effects of
peer race/income and peer prior achievement may have limited
the effect of rezoning on inequality, at least for academic
outcomes.
Table VII presents results for minority males where the
effect of PctMinorityizjc is allowed to vary by share minority of
the student’s 2000 CBG (other groups are included in the model
but the coefﬁcients are not reported).
18 We ﬁnd no evidence of
nonlinearities for academic outcomes. However, the results for
crime are highly nonlinear and indicate that nearly all of the
effect on crime is driven by minority males who live in neighbor-
hoods that are 60% minority or greater. Thus the overall effect on
crime is driven by relatively high concentrations of minority
males being grouped together. A number of studies ﬁnd support
for the notion that concentrations of minority males increase
crime in the aggregate (Cook and Ludwig 2006; Carrell and
Hoekstra 2010; Bifulco, Fletcher and Ross 2011; Deming 2011;
Imberman et al. 2012). Mechanisms by which this might occur
are suggested by Weinberg (2007), who estimates a model of en-
dogenous peer group association and ﬁnds that concentrations of
like-minded individuals will increase connectedness among
them, and by Fletcher et al. (2013), who show that increasing
racial segregation leads to a reduction in cross-race friendships.
Finally, in Online Appendix Table A19, we report results
from a speciﬁcation where we allow the effect of rezoning to
vary across eight combinations of own income, peer race, and
18. We cannot directly stratify the analysis by school racial composition be-
causeouranalysiscomparesstudentsoneithersideofanewlydrawnschoolbound-
ary, and stratifying by school race would eliminate the identifying variation.
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 peer income. We ﬁnd that poor minority males have higher rates
of criminal involvement when they are grouped together with
other poor minority males, and that crime is not signiﬁcantly af-
fected among any other groups for any combinations of demo-
graphic changes. Combined with the evidence from Table VII,
this suggests that crime increases nonlinearly when poor minor-
ity males are concentrated together in the same schools.
Changes in school context could also come from institutional
reactions to peer group composition. Kinsler (2011) shows that
although black students are about twice as likely to be suspended
from school compared to white students, all of the racial gap in
school discipline is driven byvariation across (ratherthan within)
schools. Thus it is possible that students who are assigned to
schools with more minority students exhibit similar behavior
but are treated differently. If schools with more poor and minority
TABLE VII
HETEROGENEITY BY NEIGHBORHOOD COMPOSITION
(1) (2) (3)
HS test
scores
Attend
4-year college
Ever
incarcerated
Impact on minority males who live in neighborhoods that are:
0 to 20% minority  0.062 0.174*  0.049
[0.176] [0.091] [0.049]
20 to 40% minority  0.054 0.09 0.068
[0.129] [0.058] [0.044]
40 to 60% minority  0.045 0.116*  0.076
[0.146] [0.067] [0.060]
60 to 80% minority  0.184 0.044 0.071*
[0.142] [0.039] [0.044]
80 to 100% minority  0.115 0.031 0.071**
[0.083] [0.032] [0.033]
F(all quintiles equal) 0.922 0.471 0.006
Observations 43,949 43,949 43,949
Notes. Each column shows coefﬁcients and standard errors from a separate estimate of equation (1),
where the results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 100 percentage point
greater share of students in the demographic group indicated in each row. The effects are allowed to vary
by ﬁve categories (indicated in each row) of the percent of minority residents in a student’s 2000 Census
block group. Results are pooled by grade cohort. All regressions control for race by cohort ﬁxed effects,
parcel group by prior middle and high school zone ﬁxed effects, and quadratics in ﬁfth-grade math and
reading scores plus dummies for missing scores. Column (1) is the average across all nonmissing high
school test scores in English I, algebra I, geometry, and algebra II. College attendance records are ob-
tained from the NSC data and criminal records are obtained from the Mecklenburg County Sheriff; both
can track students who leave CMS schools. Standard errors are clustered at the prior zone and new zone
by parcel group levels, using the multiway clustering procedure of Cameron et al. (2011). ***p<.01,
**p<.05, *p<.10.
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 students have a greater police presence, for example, this would
raise the probability of disciplinary action conditional on behav-
ior. If school suspensions lead to long-run increases in crime, then
differences in schools’ treatment of student behavior could ex-
plain our ﬁndings. However, we ﬁnd no effect on out-of-school
suspensions (not shown), which is important because all arrests
stemming from behavior on school grounds also result in the stu-
dent being suspended. This suggests that our crime results are
not driven by criminal offenses that occur on school grounds.
A ﬁnal possible explanation for the results is that neighbor-
hoods changed over time, which in turn affected school context.
Weinstein (2011) and Liebowitz and Page (2012) study neighbor-
hood change in Charlotte following the end of busing. Weinstein
(2011) ﬁnds that a 10 percentage point increase in the percent
black of an assigned elementary school led to a 0.4 percentage
point change in the percent minority of the neighborhood ﬁve
years after busing. However, this relatively small change is un-
likely to explain much of our results.
VII. Conclusion
Few would argue today with the basic argument laid out in
Brown v. Board of Education that state-enforced segregation
through ‘‘separate but equal’’ is unconstitutional and inequitable.
Yet the remedy authorized later by Swann v. Mecklenburg
County Schools of forced busing proved controversial and difﬁcult
to enforce (Armor and Rossell 2002). The end of court-ordered
school desegregation has led to concerns that subsequent resegre-
gation of schools will reverse some of the gains made by blacks in
the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Mickelson 2003).
We ﬁnd that the resegregation of CMS schools led to an in-
crease in racial inequality. Both whites and minorities score
lower on high school exams when they are assigned to schools
with more minority students. Our estimates imply that rezoning
in CMS widened the racial gap in math scores by about 0.025
standard deviation. Similarly, we ﬁnd that white students are
about 1 percentage point less likely to graduate from high
school or attend a four-year college when they are assigned to
schools with 10 percentage points more minority students.
Finally, weﬁnd that rezoning in CMS ledto alarge and persistent
increase in criminal activity among minority males—a 10
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 percentage point increase in share minority of a minority male’s
assigned school led to an increase in the probability of incarcer-
ation of about 1.3 percentage points.
We also ﬁnd that the effect of school segregation on academic
outcomes was larger for older cohorts, who were either in or
entering high school when busing ended. We present suggestive
evidence that increases over time in resource allocation to high-
minority high schools in CMS may explain this pattern. However,
the effects on crime do not diminish over time and remain large
nine years after the rezoning. Moreover, these effects are concen-
trated among poor minority males from highly segregated
neighborhoods.
Our ﬁndings suggest that explicit efforts may be necessary if
policy makers wish to prevent a widening of racial and economic
inequality in the wake of increases in school segregation. CMS
implemented a number of innovative policy changes over the past
decade, including the allocation of additional resources to and
intensive monitoring of high schools with concentrations of mi-
nority students. These efforts may have played some role in halt-
ing an initial widening of racial inequality in academic outcomes.
However, if peer effects are responsible for increases in crime
among minority males, then widening racial inequality in crime
may belinked inextricably with segregation. Policies that allocate
additional resources to segregated schools can improve classroom
instruction and course offerings, but only deliberately integrative
student assignment policies can change the racial or socio-
economic composition of students who walk in the doors of the
school.
University of North Carolina–Charlotte
Harvard Graduate School of Education
Columbia Graduate School of Business
Supplementary Material
An Online Appendix for this article can be found at QJE
online (qje.oxfordjournals.org).
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